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THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Nelson A. Vargas-Padilla*
Introduction
For aliens convicted of crimes in the United States, the
prospect of spending time in a federal, state, or county jail is not
the only or even the most frightening consequence of their conviction. Aliens convicted of certain crimes face protracted civil
immigration detention, limits on their ability to travel, and
removal from the United States. Not even legal permanent residence status can protect an alien convicted of certain crimes
from possibly losing their immigration status and facing deportation to their native land. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the criminal grounds by which an alien
may be charged with inadmissibility or deportability, and
removed from the United States.1
The Removal Process
To better understand the removal consequences attendant to criminal convictions, it is necessary to understand the
removal process. Aliens convicted of certain crimes may be
either deported or deemed inadmissible from the United States.2
With some limited exceptions, a determination as to whether an
alien is removable from the United States is made in removal
proceedings pursuant to the process codified at section 240 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“the Act”).3
Removal proceedings are initiated by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) with service of a Notice to Appear
(Form I-862) upon the alien and on the Immigration Court.4
The Immigration Court is an administrative adjudicatory body
within the United States Department of Justice. By statute, the
Notice to Appear must provide the alien with the nature of the
proceedings against him or her, the legal authority under which
the proceedings are being conducted, the acts or conduct
alleged to be in violation of law, and the statutory grounds
under which the alien’s removal is being sought.5
An alien placed in removal proceedings may be
charged under two separate grounds of removal – deportability
or inadmissibility.6 The grounds charged depend upon whether
an alien has or has not been admitted to the United States. The
terms “admission” and “admitted” are statutorily defined under
section 101(a)(13) of the Act.7 With respect to an alien, “admission” and “admitted” refers to the “lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”8
It is important to note that section 101(a)(13)(C) of the
Act carves out an exception to this definition for aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
Returning legal permanent residents are regarded as not seeking
admission into the United States under section 101(a)(13)(C) of
the Act unless they: (1) have abandoned or relinquished that status; (2) have been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days; (3) have engaged in illegal
activity after having departed the United States; (4) have
departed from the United States while in removal proceedings;
(5) have committed certain criminal offenses; or (6) are
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attempting to enter at a time or place other than through a designated immigration checkpoint.9
An alien admitted to the United States will be charged
with deportability under the grounds of removal enumerated at
section 237 of the Act.10 An alien who was never admitted or
is seeking admission to the United States is subject to the
grounds of inadmissibility found under section 212 of the Act.11
Both sections 237 and 212 of the Act contain criminal grounds
of removal.12
What Constitutes a “Conviction” for
Purposes of Immigration Law
In order to properly understand the immigration consequences of criminal conduct, it is important to understand the
way immigration law considers and interprets criminal convictions. The term “conviction” carries its own unique statutory
definition under federal immigration law. Conviction is defined
at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act to include “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court[,]” as well as any
adjudication where “a judge or jury has found the alien guilty[,]
. . . the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere[,]
or [the alien] has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilt[,]” and “some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint
on the alien's liberty” is imposed.13 Congress intentionally
enacted this section to include deferred adjudications, probation
before judgment, certificates of relief from disabilities, and
expungements into the definition of conviction.14
Consequently, such adjudications are considered convictions
for purposes of removal and pretermitting applications for
immigration benefits.15
When a state court grants a plea withdrawal or vacates
a conviction, the conviction will be eliminated for purposes of
immigration law where the reasons cited for the withdrawal or
vacatur involves a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding.16 Alternatively, a conviction vacated solely to avoid the adverse immigration hardships will continue to stand for immigration purposes.17 It is important to
note; however, that the Board of Immigration Appeals (the
Board) has held that vacating a conviction for failure to warn an
alien of the immigration consequences of his or her plea is a
substantive reason that will be given full faith and credit by the
Immigration Court and the Board.18
Likewise, juvenile and youthful offender adjudications
are not considered convictions under federal immigration law.19
To be excluded from the conviction definition, however, a juvenile adjudication must be pursuant to a process analogous to
that provided under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(FJDA).20 Otherwise, the adjudication will stand as a conviction for immigration purposes. For example, a state statutory
scheme which provides for a revocable youthful adjudication
determination is not analogous to the irrevocable adjudicative
status afforded under the FJDA.21 Therefore, a youthful adjudication pursuant to such an adjudicatory scheme has been held
to qualify as a “conviction” for purposes of removal proceed-
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necessary to ascertain whether the alien was convicted of a
removable offense.33 The record that may be reviewed is limited to the charging document, plea agreement, transcript of the
plea colloquy between judge and defendant, and/or a comparable judicial record.34
It is important to note that there is a distinction
between proving a charge of deportability and limiting an
alien’s access to relief from removal. DHS has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is
deportable as charged.35 Therefore, the evidence allowable to
establish a criminal charge of removal is limited to the record
of conviction. Where a charge of deportability is contested, an
alien’s own statements, made outside the context of criminal
Interpreting Convictions: The Categorical and
proceedings, are insufficient to satisfy the government’s burden
Modified Categorical Approach
of proving deportability.36 Likewise, documents not identified
as part of the record of conviction, such as police reports and
Both the federal circuit courts of appeals and the
rap sheets, are insufficient to prove deportability.37 An alien
Board have used the categorical approach in interpreting state,
seeking admission to the United States or
foreign, and federal criminal statutes for purattempting to apply for an immigration benefit,
poses of immigration law. Under the categoriAliens convicted of, or who
38 Under
cal approach, the court or adjudicator must look admit having committed, acts however, bears the burden of proof.
these
circumstances,
DHS
may
use
evidence
not
to the elements and the nature of the offense, which constitute the essential
39
considered part of the record of conviction.
rather than to the facts of the particular crime, in

In most jurisdictions, finality is a requirement for a
criminal conviction to satisfy the immigration conviction definition.23 “A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of
finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review
has been exhausted or waived.”24 Nonetheless, within the jurisdiction of both the Seventh and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals,
the courts have held that the conviction definition at section
101(a)(48)(A) of the Act has eliminated the requirement of
appellate finality.25 As such, within those jurisdictions appellate finality is not a requirement for purposes of considering a
criminal conviction for purposes of removal proceedings.

elements of a crime involving

deciding whether it fits a ground of deportabilimoral turpitude (CIMT) are
Criminal Grounds of Inadmissibility
ty.26 The Courts have deemed this necessary
deemed
inadmissible...A
CIMT
since an elaborate fact-finding process regardis an act which is per se
ing the alien’s conduct would be impracticable
Section 235 of the Act provides for the exam27
morally
reprehensible and
and unfair. Nonetheless, while the categorical
ination by an immigration officer of all persons
approach requires that the examination be limit- intrinsically wrong or malum
seeking to enter the United States.40 Once it is
ed to the elements required for a conviction, it
in se.
determined that the applicant for admission is
does permit an adjudicator to go beyond the
not a United States citizen, he or she will be
mere fact of conviction where there is a divisiinspected as an alien. Aliens who have been convicted of cerble offense – that is, where an offense encompasses conduct
tain criminal offenses are deemed to be inadmissible to the
that carries immigration consequences and conduct that does
United States under the following nine categories enumerated at
not.28
section 212 of the Act.41 Such aliens carry the burden of provFor example, the offense of brandishing a weapon
ing that they are clearly and without a doubt admissible to the
under section 18.2-282 of the Virginia Code requires proof that
United States.42
the offender pointed, held, or brandished a “firearm, air or gas
operated weapon, or any object similar in appearance to a
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
firearm, whether capable of being fired or not, in such manner
Aliens convicted of, or who admit having committed,
as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of another.”29 In conacts
which
constitute the essential elements of a crime involvtrast, the firearms ground of deportation renders removable
ing
moral
turpitude
(CIMT) are deemed inadmissible.43 Even
from the United States an alien who “at any time after admisaliens
convicted
of
or
who admit to an attempt or conspiracy to
sion is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering
commit
such
a
crime
are
inadmissible.44 CIMTs are generally
for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or
defined
as
acts
or
omissions
that are contrary to the moral laws
of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale,
or
that
are
so
base
or
vile
as
to be contrary to the accepted and
exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any weapon, part, or
customary rule of right and duty between people.45 Neither the
accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined
30
seriousness of the offense nor the severity of the sentence
in section 921(a) of Title 18) in violation of any law.” Since
imposed is determinative of whether a crime involves moral
the Virginia offense encompasses both brandishing a firearm, as
turpitude; rather, it is rather a question of the offender's intent.46
well as brandishing an object similar in appearance to a firearm,
A CIMT is an act which is per se morally reprehensible and
it is a divisible statute. This means that the offense encompassintrinsically wrong or malum in se and conspiracy to commit a
es acts which would render an alien removable under section
CIMT qualifies as a CIMT. Likewise, aiding and abetting is a
237(a)(2)(C) of the Act, and offenses which would not.31 Thus,
CIMT where the underlying crime is a CIMT.47
an adjudicator in this scenario would use the modified categorCrimes committed against people involve moral turpiical approach.
tude when a specific intent to commit the crime is an element
Pursuant to the modified categorical approach, when
of the offense. Such criminal intent may also be inferred from
faced with a divisible statute, inquiry into the facts proven
the presence of unjustified violence or the use of a dangerous
which resulted in the alien’s conviction is permissible.32 Under
weapon.48 Thus, the general intent crime of simple assault and
such circumstances examination of the record of conviction is
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battery is generally not considered a CIMT.49 This is so
because simple assault may be committed without the evil
intent, depraved or vicious motive, or corrupt mind associated
with moral turpitude.50 Simple assault and battery crimes often
include offenses involving nothing more than a nonviolent
touching.51 Given the lack of evil intent such offenses do not
qualify as CIMTs.52
Assault and battery offenses, however, may appropriately be classified as crimes of moral turpitude if they include
certain aggravating factors. For example, assault and battery
with a deadly weapon has long been deemed a crime involving
moral turpitude, because the knowing or attempted use of deadly force is deemed an act of moral depravity that takes the
offense outside the “simple assault and battery” category.53
Likewise, assault and battery offenses that necessarily involve
the intentional infliction of serious bodily injury on another
have been held to involve moral turpitude because such intentionally injurious conduct reflects a level of immorality that is
greater than that associated with a simple offensive touching.54
Another aggravating factor that elevates an assault offense to a
CIMT is the use of a deadly weapon or the infliction of serious
injury on persons whom society views as deserving of special
protection, such as children, domestic partners or peace officers.55
Aggravated assault is a CIMT where the elements of
the offense require a showing that the person acted recklessly,
consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk,
and that such disregard constituted a gross deviation from the
standard of care a reasonable person would have exercised in
the situation.56 This definition of recklessness requires an actual awareness of the risk created by the criminal violator's
action.57
Assaults committed with the intent to carry out carnal
abuse or rape are CIMTs as are sodomy, indecent assaults, and
lewd acts.58 Generally, a conviction for driving while intoxicated is not a CIMT,59 however, where an alien is convicted for
driving while intoxicated and the alien knew that his or her driver’s license was suspended, cancelled, or revoked, this conviction will be considered a CIMT.60 Likewise, failure to stop and
render aid after being involved in a vehicular accident resulting
in an injury or death is a CIMT.61
Incest, prostitution, and statutory rape are CIMTs.62
Maintaining a house of prostitution where knowledge is not an
element of the offense, however, is not.63 Both murder and voluntary manslaughter are CIMTs.64 Involuntary manslaughter,
however, is only a CIMT where there the intent element
requires that a criminal defendant consciously disregards an
unjustifiable risk.65
Moral turpitude also attaches to property crimes
involving an evil or predatory intent. Therefore, theft crimes,
which have as an essential element the intent to “permanently
deprive” an owner of his property, are CIMTs.66 Fraud against
the government is also a CIMT, but only in those cases where
the intent to inflict pecuniary loss on the government is an element of the offense.67
Alien smuggling is typically not a CIMT.68 Although
a conviction for illegally transporting individuals under a
statute that requires a fraudulent intent to conceal the individuals from law enforcement authorities is.69 Arson, accessory
after the fact, and drug trafficking are all CIMTs.70 Writing bad
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checks is a CIMT where the statute has as an essential element
the intent to defraud.71 Contempt of court is not a CIMT.72 A
conviction for knowingly procuring naturalization in violation
of 18 U.S.C. section 1425(a) is a CIMT.73 Obstruction of justice for knowingly providing false information to a police officer to prevent the apprehension or to obstruct prosecution of
any person is a CIMT.74
Exceptions to the CIMT Ground of Inadmissibility
Two statutory exceptions to the CIMT ground of inadmissibility exist. First, section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the Act
exempts an alien from the CIMT ground of removal if the
alien’s CIMT conviction occurred when he or she was underage. Thus, an alien who is under eighteen years of age when the
CIMT was committed and was released from any confinement
more than five years before his or her application for admission
to the United States is not rendered inadmissible to the United
States. Second, under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), an alien convicted of a petty offense is not inadmissible to the United
States.75 To qualify as a petty offense, the alien’s criminal conviction must be for a single offense for which the potential maximum sentence does not exceed one year and the actual sentence to imprisonment does not exceed six months.76
Controlled Substance Violator
An alien is rendered inadmissible under section
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act if he or she violates any law or
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country
relating to a controlled substance, as that term is defined under
21 U.S.C. section 802.77 This ground of inadmissibility applies
where the alien is convicted of an offense involving a controlled
substance listed on the federal drug schedules.78
Multiple Criminal Convictions
Any alien convicted of to or more crimes, other than
purely political offenses, is inadmissible under section
212(a)(2)(B) of the Act.79 For this ground of inadmissibility to
apply, the aggregate sentences to confinement must be for five
years or more.80
Controlled Substance Traffickers
Section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act renders inadmissible
any alien whom the consular officer or the Attorney General
knows, or has reason to believe, is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance.81 This includes aliens who have,
to the knowledge of a consulate or Attorney General, aided,
abetted, assisted, conspired, or colluded with others in the illicit trafficking of controlled substances.82 In order for this inadmissibility ground to apply, the examining immigration officer
must, at the time the alien is inspected and admitted into the
United States, have a reason to believe that he or she was an
illicit trafficker in any controlled substance.83 Consequently, a
conviction solely for possession of narcotics, without any allegation in the record that such possession was related to illicit
trafficking, will not sustain a ground of inadmissibility under
section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act.84
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice
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Under section 212(a)(2)(D) of the Act, any alien coming to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to
engage in prostitution, or who has engaged in prostitution within ten years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or
adjustment of status, is inadmissible.85 Similarly, an alien is
inadmissible if he or she has: directly or indirectly procured or
attempted to procure prostitutes or persons for the purpose of
prostitution; procured or attempted to procure for import prostitutes within ten years of the date of application for a visa,
admission, or adjustment of status; or received in whole or in
part, the proceeds of prostitution.86 Any alien who is coming to
the United States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not related to prostitution, is likewise
inadmissible.87
Certain Aliens Involved in Serious Criminal
Activity who have Asserted Immunity from Prosecution

the benefit.92
Money Laundering
Section 212(a)(2)(I) of the Act renders inadmissible
any alien whom a consular officer or the Attorney General
knows, or has reason to believe, has engaged, is engaging, or
seeks to enter the United States to engage, in a money laundering offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections 1956 or 1957.93
These sections include any alien who the consular officer or the
Attorney General knows is, or has been, a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in an offense to
engage in a money laundering offense described in 18 U.S.C.
sections 1956 or 1957.94
Criminal Grounds of Deportability

Any alien who committed a serious criminal offense in
Criminal aliens who have been admitted to the United
the United States, sought and obtained immunity from criminal
States are subject to the criminal grounds of deportability under
prosecution, departed from the United States, and has not subsection 237 of the Act.95 Unlike the grounds of inadmissibility,
sequently submitted fully to the jurisdiction of the court in the
it is the government’s burden to prove by clear and convincing
United States having jurisdiction with respect to that offense is
evidence that an alien is deportable under any of the grounds
inadmissible.88 For purposes of this ground of inadmissibility,
enumerated under section 237 of the Act.96 The criminal
a “serious criminal offense” is defined at section
grounds of deportability are as follows:
101(h) of the Act to include: (1) any felony; (2) Under section 212(a)(2)(D) of
1. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
any crime of violence, as defined under 18
the Act, any alien coming to
U.S.C. section 16; and (3) any crime of reckless
the United States solely, princiUnder section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act,
driving or of driving while intoxicated or under
pally, or incidentally toengage an alien is deportable from the United States for
the influence of alcohol or prohibited subin prostitution, or who has
having been convicted of a crime involving
stances, if such crime involves personal injury
engaged
in
prostitution
within
moral turpitude committed within five years of
89
to another.
10 years of the date of applica- admission, or, in the case of an alien accorded
Significant traffickers in Persons
tion for a visa, admission, or legal permanent resident status under an “S”
visa, within ten years of admission.97 Section
Section 212(a)(2)(H)(i) of the Act ren- adjustment of status, is inad- 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act renders deportable
missible.
ders inadmissible any alien listed in a report
an alien who, at any time after admission, is
submitted pursuant to 22 U.S.C. section 7108,
convicted of two or more crimes involving
and any alien the consular officer or the Attorney General
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal
knows or has reason to believe is or has been a knowing aider,
misconduct.98 Crimes are considered not to arise out of a sinabettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with a trafficker in
gle scheme of criminal misconduct when the acts performed
severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined in 22 U.S.C.
constitute in and of themselves, complete, individual, and dissection 7102.90 The term “severe forms of trafficking in pertinct crimes; this is the case regardless of whether one crime
sons” includes: (1) trafficking in which a commercial sex act is
follows closely to the other, whether the crimes are similar in
induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person
character, and even whether the crimes are part of an overall
induced to perform such act has not attained eighteen years of
criminal plan.99
age; or (2) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of
2. Aggravated Felony
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involSection 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act renders any alien
untary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.91
convicted of an aggravated felony after being admitted to the
Under this section of the Code, the President of the
United States deportable.100 “Aggravated felony” is an immiUnited States reports to Congress foreign persons that the
gration term of art which is defined by section 101(a)(43) of the
President determines are appropriate for sanctions due to havAct.101 Aggravated felonies encompass state, federal, or foring been engaged in human trafficking.
Section
eign convictions. An aggravated felony need not actually be a
212(a)(2)(H)(ii) of the Act renders inadmissible any alien
“felony” as that term is commonly defined. The federal circuit
whom the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has
courts of appeals as well as the Board have noted that Congress
reason to believe is the spouse, son, or daughter of the inadmismade its intent clear in enacting the aggravated felony definisible alien, and who within the previous five years, knowingly
tion to specifically include within the definition offenses with
no link to any term of imprisonment. As such, state, federal, or
obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of
foreign convictions which fit the definition at section
that alien. Exceptions section exist for sons and daughters of
101(a)(43) of the Act qualify as aggravated felonies, even if
the trafficker who were children at the time he or she received
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the convicting jurisdiction classifies the offense as a misdemeanor.102 The term aggravated felony as defined under section
101(a)(43) of the Act includes the following offenses:
Murder, Rape, and Sexual Abuse of a Minor
Section 101(a)(43)(A)† of the Act includes within the
aggravated felony definition the crimes of murder, rape, and
sexual abuse of a minor.103 The Board and federal circuit courts
have adopted the federal definition of minor found under 18
U.S.C. section 3509(a)(2), and define it as a person under the
age of eighteen.104 In adopting this definition, the Board found
that it best reflected the common usage of the word “minor”,
and conformed to the intent of Congress to maintain a broad
definition of an aggravated felony to protect children.105
The Board and the federal circuit courts of appeals
have also looked to the definition of sexual abuse under 18
U.S.C. section 3509(a) in interpreting the term “sexual abuse of
a minor.” It is important to note that neither the Board nor the
federal courts have adopted this statutory section as a definitive
standard but, instead, have invoked it as a guide in identifying
the types of crimes that would be considered to be sexual abuse
of a minor.106 Consequently, sexual abuse of a minor includes
the “employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in, sexually explicit conduct.”107 The offense includes
“molestation, prostitution, or other form [sic] of sexual
exploitation of children, or incest with children.”108 The “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony also includes convictions for statutory rape.109 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
has also held that the offense of statutory rape qualifies as an
“aggravated felony” under the “rape” language found at section
101(a)(43)(A) of the Act.110 The First Circuit noted that
“[u]nder the explicit language of the INA, all rape - including
statutory rape - comes within the aggravated felony taxonomy.”111
Controlled Substance Trafficker

first-time simple possession of marijuana is punishable under
the Controlled Substances Act only as a misdemeanor.116 The
same alien convicted in New York for first-time simple possession of over five grams of cocaine-base, would be removable as
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony since possession of
five grams or more of cocaine-base is a felony offense under the
Controlled Substances Act.117
Illicit Trafficking in Firearms and Destructive Devices
Section 101(a)(43)(C) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony illicit trafficking in firearms or
destructive devices, as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 921, or
explosive materials, as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 841(c).118
The term “firearm” under this section is defined under 18
U.S.C. section 921(a)(3) to include any weapon which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by
the action of an explosive, the frame or receiver of any such
weapon, firearm silencer, or any destructive device.119 Antique
firearms produced on or before 1898 are specifically excluded
from the firearms definition.120 Destructive device is defined as
any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, rocket
having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile
having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than onequarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices previously described.121 Destructive devise also includes projectile weapons which have a barrel with a bore of more than onehalf inch in diameter.122 Section 841(c) of Title 18 defines
“explosive materials” to mean means explosives, blasting
agents, and detonators.123
Money Laundering
Section 101(a)(43)(D) of the Act includes within the
definition of “aggravated felony” money laundering offenses,
as described under 18 U.S.C. section 1956 or 1957 where the
amount of the funds exceeds $10,000.124
Miscellaneous Firearms and Explosive Materials Offenses

Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act includes in the definition of aggravated felony, state, federal, or foreign convictions for illicit trafficking in any controlled substance, as
defined in 21 U.S.C. section 802, including any drug trafficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(2).112 This
section has been interpreted as encompassing two offenses.
The first part of the definition refers to any state, federal, or foreign convictions involving unlawful trading or dealing in a controlled substance.113 The second part of the definition refers to
any state, federal, or foreign conviction which can be construed
as a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(2).
The term “drug trafficking crime” is defined at 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(2) to include any “felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. section 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. section 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of Title 46.”114 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the “drug trafficking” aggravated felony
to include any state or foreign conviction, whether it is a felony
or misdemeanor, which is analogous to a federal felony enumerated under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(2).115 For example, an
alien convicted for first-time simple possession of marijuana in
New York has not been convicted of an aggravated felony, since

Fall 2007

Section 101(a)(43)(E) of the Act includes within the
definition of “aggravated felony” explosive device offenses
described in 18 U.S.C. sections 824(h), (i), or 18 U.S.C. section
844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i).125 Aliens convicted of a firearms
offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4),
or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), (r), or 18 U.S.C. sections 924(b) or (h),
or 26 U.S.C. section 5861, is an aggravated felon. In interpreting this section, the Board has found that the effect on interstate
or foreign commerce element required for conviction is purely
a federal jurisdictional provision; consequently, a state conviction is not required to have this as an essential element for it to
be classified as an aggravated felony.126
Crime of Violence
Section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act includes in the definition of aggravated felony crimes of violence for which a term of
imprisonment is at least one year.127 The sentence to imprisonment includes the period of incarceration or confinement
ordered by a court of law, regardless of any suspension of the
imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence.128
The phrase “crime of violence” incorporates the definition
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under 18 U.S.C. section 16 as:
(a) An offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another, or
(b) Any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense.129
For a state, federal, or foreign conviction to qualify as a crime
of violence aggravated felony the offense must involve some
specific intent to commit a violent act.130 Convictions that have
as an essential element merely negligent or accidental conduct,
do not qualify as aggravated felonies.131
For example, the United States Supreme Court has
held that although Florida’s vehicular manslaughter statute
involves a substantial risk of force be used in the commission
of the offense, that force could be accidental.132 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a Virginia conviction for vehicular manslaughter did not satisfy the aggravated felony definition under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act.133
As such, neither reckless driving nor involuntary manslaughter
qualifies as crimes of violence. This is because the violence
risked by the commission of the offense must be intentional,
rather than accidental in nature.134
Other offenses, which have been construed as a crime
of violence, aggravated felony, include arson, burglary, assault,
unauthorized use of a vehicle, sexual battery, and statutory
rape.135 Arson has been identified as an aggravated felony
because fire, which is a destructive force, necessarily involves
physical force. When that destructive force is maliciously set in
motion by a human hand for the purpose of burning a home,
church, meetinghouse, or other similar structure, a physical
force is used against the property of another.136
Where a one-year sentence has been imposed, the
crimes of both burglary and unauthorized use of a vehicle are
aggravated felonies under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act,
because an essential element of both offenses is that the perpetrator break and enter someone else’s property. The act of
breaking and entering by its nature means that violence will
have to be used to commit the offense.137
Sexual battery and statutory rape have been identified
as crimes of violence.138 The Board and federal courts have
noted that the crime of statutory rape encompasses sexual conduct by an adult with a person incapable of legally consenting
to the act.139 When an older person attempts to sexually touch
a child, there is always a substantial risk that physical force will
be used to ensure the child’s compliance.140 Most courts have
equated a victim’s legal incapacity to consent with an actual
unwillingness to be touched, and thus, have concluded that
there is a substantial risk that physical force may be used in
ensuring the child’s compliance.141
Some circuit courts of appeals, however, such as the
Ninth and Seventh circuits have either modified or rejected this
approach. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has distinguished cases in which the victim and the perpetrator are close
in age.142 In the case of a twenty-three-year-old alien convicted of statutory rape for engaging in consensual sex with a minor
age seventeen, the Ninth Circuit held that legal incapacity of the
victim did not suggest a risk that force might be used in com-
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mitting the offense.143 As such, the Court rejected the argument
that the alien’s conviction was an aggravated felony as defined
under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has, likewise, held that the age of the perpetrator and victim are relevant for purposes of determining
whether the conviction qualifies as a crime of violence and
aggravated felony.144 The Court reasoned that absent a significant age difference, a statutory rape conviction involving consensual sex between an adult male and his fifteen-year-old girlfriend did not, by its nature, involve a substantial risk that physical force would be used, and therefore, would not satisfy the
aggravated felony definition found under section 101(a)(43)(F)
of the Act.145
Theft and Burglary and Receipt of Stolen Property
Section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act includes theft, receipt
of stolen property, and burglary offenses for which the term of
imprisonment imposed is at least one year within the aggravated felony definition.146 The Board has held that unlike CIMTs,
Congress’ use of the term “theft” in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the
Act was intended to be broadly interpreted.147 The Board,
therefore, concluded that a “theft offense” does not require as a
statutory element the specific intent to permanently deprive an
owner of his property, but rather, a taking of property constitutes a “theft offense” whenever there is criminal intent to
deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, even
if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.148
The necessary elements for a conviction to be an
aggravated felony under the “receipt of stolen property” statutory provision are actual knowledge that the received goods
were stolen or evidence demonstrating that a reasonable person
would have realized that they were stolen. 149
In interpreting the term “burglary” for purposes of section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, the Board adopted the generic
federal definition of burglary expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Taylor v. US.150 According to the Court in
Taylor, in order for a state burglary offense to qualify as an
aggravated felony, it must include the elements of the unlawful
or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other
structure with the intent to commit a crime.151 As such, under
this definition a conviction of burglary of a vehicle would not
qualify as a “burglary” aggravated felony since the federal definition specifically requires that the offense be committed on a
building or structure, not a vehicle.152
Kidnapping and Ransom Demands
Section 101(a)(43)(H) of the Act, includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions for kidnapping,
demand for ransom, and threats to kidnap as described in 18
U.S.C. sections 875, 876, 877 or 18 U.S.C. section 1202.153
This section includes within the definition of aggravated felony
convictions for extortion by threats to injure the property or reputation of another, convictions for receipt, possession, or disposal of ransom money, and convictions for transporting, transmitting, or transferring ransom money.154
Child Pornography
Section 101(a)(43)(I) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony any state, federal, or foreign
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conviction for child pornography as described in 18 U.S.C. sections 2251, 2251A, or 2252.155 This section includes within the
aggravated felony definition convictions for possessing, making, transferring, and distributing child pornography.156 This
section also describes convictions for the sexual exploitation of
children for purposes of making child pornography.157
Racketeering and Gambling
Section 101(a)(43)(J) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony any racketeering offense
described in 18 U.S.C. section 1962, or any offense described
in 18 U.S.C. sections 1084 or 1955, relating to gambling offenses, for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may
be imposed.158
Prostitution and Slavery
Section 101(a)(43)(K) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions for human trafficking.159 This section includes convictions for owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business. It also
includes convictions for transporting persons for the purpose of
prostitution, peonage, slavery, and involuntary servitude.160
Sabotage and Treason
Section 101(a)(43)(L) of the Act includes within the
aggravated felony definition convictions for sabotage and treason.161 For purposes of this section, convictions for offenses
described in 18 U.S.C. section 793 (relating to gathering or
transmitting national defense information), 18 U.S.C. section
798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 18 U.S.C.
section 2153 (relating to sabotage), or 18 U.S.C. sections 2381
or 2382 (relating to treason), are aggravated felonies.162
Fraud and Tax Evasion
Section 101(a)(43)(M) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions involving fraud or
deceit in which a loss to the victim exceeds $10,000.163 There
is no need to prove that the actual loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000 in order for a fraud conviction to qualify as an
aggravated felony under this section.164 Instead, it is sufficient
that the potential loss be more than $10,000.165 Moreover, the
amount of loss to the victim need not be an actual element of
the state, federal, or foreign offense and may be proven with
evidence contained outside of the record of conviction.166
Convictions for tax evasion as described in 26 U.S.C. section
7201 are also included within the definition of aggravated
felony, provided that the revenue loss to the Government
exceeds $10,000.167
Alien Smuggling
Section 101(a)(43)(N) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions for alien smuggling.168 For an alien smuggling conviction to qualify as an
aggravated felony under this section, the offense must be one
described in sections 274(a)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.169
Convictions under this section include smuggling and harboring
aliens. An exception exists where an alien can affirmatively
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show that this was his or her only offense and it was committed
for the purpose of smuggling into the United States his or her
spouse, child, or parent.170
Previous Removals
Section 101(a)(43)(O) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions for unlawful
attempts to re-enter the United States in violation of sections
275(a) or 276 of the Act, committed aliens who were previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an aggravated
felony.171
Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting,
Mutilating or Altering a Passport
Section 101(a)(43)(P) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions for falsely making,
forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport in violation of Title 18, sections 1543 or 1546 of the United States
Code, for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least
twelve months.172 An exception to this section exists where it
is a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown
that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting,
abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent, and
no other individual, to enter the United States.173
Failure to Appear
Section 101(a)(43)(Q) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions relating to a failure
to appear by a defendant for service of a criminal sentence.174
For purposes of this section, the underlying offense must be
punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years or more to
qualify as an aggravated felony under this section.175
Bribery, Forgery, Counterfeiting,
and Trafficking in Vehicles
Section 101(a)(43)(R) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions for commercial
bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles whose
identification numbers have been altered.176 This section
requires that the alien be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of at least one year.177
Obstruction of Justice and Perjury
Section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the
term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year.178
Interpreting this section, the Board adopted the federal statutory definition of perjury found at 18 U.S.C. section 1621,179
defining perjury to include lying under an oath administered by
a competent tribunal, officer, or person authorized to administer such an oath.180 Perjury includes both oral and written statements, in which a defendant willfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes to a material matter which he or she does
not believe to be true.181
The obstruction of justice aggravated felony does not
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include the crime of misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. section 4.182 Misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. section 4 is
defined as whoever: “having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to
some judge or other person in civil or military authority under
the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 3 years, or both.”183 Elements of the crime of
misprision of a felony are that the principal committed and
completed the felony alleged and that the defendant had full
knowledge of that fact, failed to notify the authorities, and took
an affirmative step to conceal the crime.184 The Board held that
in general, obstruction of justice involves interfering with court
proceedings or the intent to harm or retaliate against others who
cooperate in the process of justice.185 Misprision of a felony
does not have as an element either active interference with court
proceedings or investigation, or action or threat of action
against those who would cooperate in the process of justice.
Consequently, the Board concluded that a conviction for misprision of a felony did not qualify as an obstruction of justice
aggravated felony.186
By contrast, the Board construed a conviction for
accessory after the fact under 18 U.S.C. section 3 as being an
obstruction of justice aggravated felony.187 The Board reasoned
that 18 U.S.C. section 3 criminalizes actions knowingly taken to
“hinder or prevent (another’s) apprehension, trial or punishment.”188
Bail Jumping
Section 101(a)(43)(T) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony convictions relating to an alien’s
failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to
answer to or dispose of a felony charge, for which a sentence of
two years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed.189
Attempt and Conspiracy
Section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act includes within the
definition of aggravated felony any attempt or conspiracy to
commit any of the aggravated felony offenses listed above.190
For example, the Board has held that an alien convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud has been convicted of an aggravated
felony within the meaning of sections 101(a)(43)(M)(i) and (U)
of the Act, where the substantive crime that was the object of
the conspiracy was an offense that involved “fraud or deceit”
and where the potential loss to the victim or victims exceeded
$10,000.191
3. High Speed Flight
An alien convicted of high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 758 is
deportable from the United States.192 Section 758 of Title 18
requires for conviction that the alien flee federal, state, or local
law enforcement officers in a motor vehicle in excess of the
legal speed limit.193 An alien who runs away from an immigration checkpoint, but does not exceed the speed limit cannot be
convicted under 18 U.S.C. section 758.194
4. Failure to Register as a Sex Offender
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Any alien convicted under 18 U.S.C. section 2250 for
failing to register as a sex offender is deportable.195 This section includes state and federal convictions for failing to regsister as a sex offender under state or federal law.196
5. Controlled Substance Offenses
Any alien, who at any time after admission, has been
convicted of a violation of any law or regulation of a State, the
United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance, as defined in 21 U.S.C. section 802, is deportable.197
The phrase “relating to” a controlled substance has been interpreted broadly to encompass any offense connected to a controlled substance violation.198
The statutory ground of deportability carves out an
exception for aliens convicted of a single offense of thirty
grams or less of marijuana for one’s own personal use.199 This
exception has been very narrowly construed by the Board and
federal courts of appeals.200 For example, this exception will
not apply where an alien has been convicted of possessing thirty grams or less of marijuana while incarcerated.201
6. Firearms Offenses
An alien, who at any time after admission, is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale,
exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of
attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale,
exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any firearm or destructive device, as that term is defined under 18 U.S.C. section
921(a), is deportable.202
The elements of conviction must encompass that the
weapon was indeed a firearm.203 Proof of this fact must be
found in the record of conviction in order for deportability to be
sustained by the Immigration Court.204 Evidence from the
police report that the weapon was a firearm is insufficient to
sustain this ground of deportability because the police report is
not a part of the record of conviction.205 The alien’s own admission during removal proceedings, indicating that he or she was
convicted of possessing a firearm is, likewise, insufficient to
establish deportability under this section if the statute is divisible, the alien contests removal, and the record of conviction is
silent as to the weapon possessed.206
Much like the controlled substance ground of deportability, the language “relating to” a firearms offense has been
interpreted broadly. Consequently, a conviction for robbery,
which has as an element of conviction the use of a firearm during the commission of the offense, will support a charge of
deportability under this section.207
7. Domestic Violence, Stalking, and Child Abuse
A conviction for domestic violence will render an alien
deportable.208 Domestic violence is defined as a “crime of violence,” under 18 U.S.C. section 16, committed by a current or
former spouse, by an individual with whom the victim shares a
child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or
has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic or
family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense
occurs, or by any other individual against a victim who is pro-
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tected from that individua’s acts under the domestic or family
violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal
government, or unit of local government. 209
Any alien convicted for the crime of child abuse, child
neglect, or child abandonment is deportable.210 Any alien who
at any time after admission is enjoined under a protection order
issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged
in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that
involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for
whom the protection order was issued is deportable.211 The
term “protection order” is defined as any injunction issued for
the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence, including temporary or final orders issued by civil
or criminal courts.212
8. Document Fraud Conviction
Any alien who has been convicted under section 274C
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1324c, is deportable.213 Section
274C makes it unlawful to forge, counterfeit, alter, or falsely
make any document for the purpose of satisfying a requirement
or obtaining a benefit under the Immigration and Nationality
Act.214 This includes the possession, use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document.215
Conclusion
How immigration law treats an alien convicted of
committing a crime often turns on decisions made by criminal
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges. Clearly, immigration law must no longer be under the rubric of specialty practitioners.
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The article does not examine the effect an alien’s criminal
conduct can have on applications for immigration benefits, such
as adjustment to legal permanent residence or naturalization.
Instead, the article provides a general overview of what crimes
may result in removal from the United States. It is not intended to replace research on the many issues flowing from the
intersection between immigration and criminal law.
2 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1229. Other methods for removing an alien from
the United States include expedited and administrative removal.
Expedited removal involves a screening process at a port of
entry followed by the denial of an alien’s admission to the
United States and removal where appropriate. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225. Administrative removal is a process in which an alien
who is unlawfully present in the United States and has been
convicted of an aggravated felony may be ordered removed by
DHS without being referred to the Immigration Court. See 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b). For purposes of this article, I will focus only
on the removal process before the Immigration Court.
4 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
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8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).
8 U.S.C. § 1227.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
12 8 U.S.C. § 1227; 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
13 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
14 See Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224, 227 (BIA 1998) (stating that Congress deliberately included deferred adjudications
in the definition of “conviction”); Matter of Chairez, 21 I&N
Dec. 44, 45-47 (BIA 1995) (finding that a deferred judgment is
considered a “conviction” under the Act).
15 See Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 61-62 (2d Cir. 2001)
(concluding that the term “conviction,” for the purposes of
immigration, applies when a court entered a formal judgment of
guilt, as well as when the judge or jury entered a conviction or
the alien entered a guilty or nolo contendere plea or the alien
admitted sufficient facts to warrant a guilty finding, and the
court ordered some form of restraint on the alien’s liberty,
penalty, or punishment).
16 See, e.g., Gradiz v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007);
Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 521-23 (BIA 1999) (asserting that under the INA, the immigration consequences of a
“conviction” apply to an alien even where the state applied a
subsequent rehabilitative state action, so long as the subsequent
action had no relation to the merits of the original charge);
Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224, 227-28 (BIA 1998) (claiming that the revisions to the INA were intended to clarify that for
the purposes of immigration, an original finding or confession
of guilt is sufficient for a “conviction,” even if states view the
conviction differently under various provisions that ameliorate
the effects of the conviction under state law).
17 See, e.g., Pickering v. Gonzalez, 465 F.3d 263, 266-67 (6th
Cir. 2006) (upholding the BIA’s finding that convictions vacated to avoid immigration hardships stand for the purpose of
immigration law, but finding that the government has the burden of showing that this was the reason for vacating the conviction); Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003)
(holding that convictions vacated solely for the purpose of
avoiding immigration law consequences continue to stand for
the purposes of immigration law). But see Lujan-Armendariz v.
INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d
996 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a conviction vacated or
expunged under state or foreign law analogous to 18 U.S.C. §
3607 no longer remains a conviction for purposes of immigration law).
18 Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878, 879-80 (BIA 2006).
19 See, e.g., Matter of Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362, 1365-66
(BIA 2000) (explaining that a juvenile delinquency proceeding
results in the adjudication of a status rather than a conviction for
a crime).
20 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000). See, e.g., Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239
F.3d 409, 412-13 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that where a juvenile
was charged and pled guilty in adult court, the FJDA does not
apply, and the juvenile has a conviction for the purposes of
immigration law); Matter of Devison, 22 I&N Dec. at 1373-74
(concluding that where a juvenile adjudication was pursuant to
a process analogous to the FJDA, the adjudication and subsequent resentencing for violating probation are not “convictions”
for the purpose of immigration law); Matter of De La Nues, 18
10
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I&N Dec. 140, 144 (BIA 1981) (holding that the applicant has
the burden of showing that he was dealt with as a juvenile under
a foreign country’s laws and that the procedures are equivalent
to those of the FJDA).
21 See Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that a revocable youth adjudication determination
is not the equivalent of the FJDA’s procedures and constitutes a
“conviction” for the purpose of removal proceedings, reasoning
that revocable procedures are more akin to expungement or
deferred adjudication than the juvenile delinquency procedures
of the FJDA).
22 Id.
23 See Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (ordering that the
judgment be reversed because based on the record, the Court
was unable to determine whether the conviction was sufficiently finalized as to support deportation).
24 Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 21 n.1 (BIA 1995).
25 See Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir.
2004) (holding that Congress amended the INA to no longer
require finality for convictions); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994,
1009 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress removed the finality requirement).
26 See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (holding
that the analysis of crimes is based on the statute itself instead
of the individualized alleged conduct).
27 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601-02 (1990)
(finding that legislative history supports the categorical
approach).
28 See Matter of Sweetser, 22 I&N Dec. 709, 714 (BIA 1999)
(holding that in determining whether divisible offenses sustain
grounds of deportability, courts look at the elements required to
sustain the conviction when examining the record of conviction
and the documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal
conviction).
29 VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-282 (2005) (emphasis added).
30 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) (emphasis added).
31 See Matter of Sweetser, 22 J&N Dec. at 709 (applying a
divisibility analysis to crimes involving physical force); Matter
of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136, 137-38 (BIA 1989) (applying a
divisibility analysis to crimes involving moral turpitude);
Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N Dec. 269, 270 (BIA 1975).
32 See Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 469 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting that the court’s inquiry was whether the defendant’s
conduct covered by the statute was a crime, and not whether
any conduct that the statute covered was a crime).
33 See Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316, 322 (BIA 1996)
(applying a divisibility analysis to crimes involving firearms).
34 See id. at 321 (holding that a police report could not be used
in determining deportability in instances where the inquiry is
focused on a criminal conviction and not the alien’s conduct);
see Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S.Ct. 815, 819 (2007)
(noting what parts of the record are reviewed under a modified
categorical approach).
35 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3).
36 See Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330, 335-36 (BIA 1996)
(finding that an alien’s deportation hearing testimony about the
underlying conduct which gave rise to a firearms-related conviction was not sufficient proof of deportability).
37 See Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. at 321 (holding that a
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police report could not be used in determining deportability in
instances where the inquiry is focused on a criminal conviction
and not the alien’s conduct).
38 8 U.S.C. § 1992a(c)(2).
39 Id.
40 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3).
41 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
42 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(20(A).
43 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
44 Id.
45 See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 235 nn.6-7 (1951)
(examining what is encompassed in the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude”).
46 See Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 1992) (analyzing what is included in the definition of CIMT).
47 Id. at 582; Matter of Bader, 17 I&N Dec. 525, 529 (BIA
1980) (concluding that a conviction for conspiracy to commit a
CIMT qualifies as a CIMT).
48 See Matter of O-, 3 I&N Dec. 193, 194-95 (BIA 1948) (noting that assault with a deadly weapon in general has been held
to be a CIMT).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Matter of Faualaau, 21 I&N Dec. 475, 478 (BIA
1996) (stating that an alien’s intent is crucial to determinations
regarding moral turpitude and finding that simple assault does
not constitute a CIMT); Matter of Perez-Contreras, 20 I&N
Dec. 615, 619 (BIA 1992) (holding that criminal negligence
where intent was not required for a conviction did not constitute
a CIMT).
51 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 637 (1954).
52 See Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968, 970-71 (BIA 2006)
(explaining the difference between CIMTs and crimes that carry
a similar label of assault, aggravated assault, and battery, but
lacking the evil intent found in CIMTs).
53 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 637 (1954) (holding
that the knowing use or attempted use of deadly force and not
the gravity of punishment imposed is determinative of whether
a crime involves moral turpitude).
54 See Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692, 695 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a heightened level of injury inflicted can raise assault to
a CIMT); Matter of P-, 7 I&N Dec. 376, 377 (BIA 1956)
(affirming that “maiming or wounding” during an assault and
battery involves moral turpitude).
55 See, e.g., Medina v. United States., 259 F.3d 220 (4th Cir.
2001) (finding it was within the INS’s discretion to conclude
that domestic partner assault was a CIMT, although INS ultimately chose to drop deportation proceedings); Matter of Tran,
21 I&N Dec. 291, 295 (BIA 1996) (concluding that willful
infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or parent
of one’s child, is a CIMT); Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669,
673 (BIA 1988) (concluding that aggravated assault on a peace
officer was a CIMT).
56 Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. 611, 614 (BIA 1976). See
Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
where all categories of an aggravated assault statute involve
bodily injury together with a minimum mens rea of recklessness, any aggravated assault would be a CIMT).

Criminal Law Brief

57

Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. at 613.
See, e.g., Matter of Beato, 10 I&N. Dec. 730, 733, 735 (BIA
1964) (holding that attempted assault with intent to commit carnal abuse and rape is a CIMT); Matter of Z , 7 I&N Dec. 253,
255 (BIA 1956) (holding that indecent assault is a CIMT);
Matter of S , 8 I&N Dec. 409, 415 (BIA 1959) (holding that
sodomy and gross indecency between male persons are
CIMTs); Matter of B , 5 I&N Dec. 538, 539 (BIA 1953) (noting
that rape and assault with intent to rape are CIMTs).
59 Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78, 86 (BIA 2001)
(holding that multiple DUI offenses that on their own are not
CIMTs do not, by themselves, aggregate into a CIMT).
60 Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188, 1195-96 (BIA
1999) (holding that while a simple DUI is not a CIMT, an
aggravated DUI where one commits a DUI while knowingly
driving on a suspended, canceled, or revoked license, is a
CIMT).
61 Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir.
June 29, 2007) (concluding that failure to stop and render aid
after a motor vehicle accident resulting in an injury or death is
a CIMT).
62 See, e.g., Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir. 1976) (statutory rape); Matter of Y , 3 I&N Dec. 544 (C.O. 1949) (incest);
Matter of W , 4 I&N Dec. 401 (C.O. 1951) (prostitution);
Matter of A , 3 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1948).
63 Matter of A , 3 I&N Dec. 94, 170 (BIA 1948) (holding that
the broad statute of keeping a house of ill-fame does not involve
a CIMT in every instance).
64 See, e.g., Matter of Lopez-Amaro, 23 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA
1993) (murder); Matter of Chavez-Calderon, 20 I&N
Dec. 744 (BIA 1993) (voluntary manslaughter).
65 See, e.g., Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1995)
(consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that resulted in the death of the alien’s child was a CIMT).
66 Matter of Grazley, 14 I&N Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973) (noting
that thefts with an intent for a permanent taking are CIMTs).
67 See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
68 See Matter of Tiwari, 19 I&N Dec. 875, 881 (BIA 1989)
(holding that alien smuggling is not a CIMT).
69 See Fuentes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 724, 726 (5th Cir.
2007) (declaring that alien smuggling with an intent to deceive
law enforcement is a CIMT).
70 Matter of S , 3 I&N Dec. 617 (BIA 1949) (arson); NavarroLopez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (accessory
after the fact); Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997)
(drug trafficking).
71 Matter of Colbourne, 13 I&N Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1969)
(finding that a bad check conviction was not a CIMT where
there was no evidence that the alien had knowledge that his
account lacked sufficient funds to cover the check).
72 Matter of P-, 6 I&N Dec. 400, 404 (BIA 1954) (holding that
there was no CIMT where an alien was held in contempt for
court for violating a court order, and the alien’s intent was not
base or vile and the conduct itself was not base, vile, or inherently immoral).
73 See Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that all convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)’s prohibition against “knowingly procuring or attempting to procure,
contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documen58
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tary or other evidence of naturalization or citizenship,” are
CIMTs).
74 Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding that obstruction of justice lacks the element of fraud
but the elements of making false statements and concealing
criminal activity are sufficient to render it a CIMT).
75 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
76 See, e.g., Matter of Garcia-Hernandez, 23 I&N Dec. 590, 593
(BIA 2003) (concluding that respondent’s misdemeanor conviction for spousal injury was not a basis for inadmissibility).
77 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
78 See Argaw v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 521, 527 (4th Cir. 2005)
(reversing Board of Immigration’s decision ordering the
removal of petitioner based on the court’s conclusion that the
drug (“khat”) the petitioner brought into the States was neither
listed, nor established, to be a controlled substance under 21
U.S.C. § 812); Matter of Mena, 17 I&N Dec. 38, 39-40 (BIA
1979) (upholding respondent’s deportation on the basis that
respondent admitted, during the acceptance of a guilty plea
(after being fully and carefully advised of his rights), that the
controlled substance in his possession was heroin).
79 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).
80 Id.
81 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C).
82 See, e.g., Matter of Rico, 16 I&N Dec. 181, 186-87 (BIA
1977) (dismissing respondent’s appeal upon the court’s conclusion that respondent was a knowing and conscious participant
or conduit in an attempt to smuggle marijuana into the United
States).
83 See Matter of Rocha, 20 I&N Dec. 944, 946-48 (BIA 1995)
(finding that under the plain language of the Act, because the
examining officer did not “know” or articulate a “reason to
believe” at the time of respondent’s entry that the respondent
was a trafficker, the immigration judge did not err in finding the
respondent “not deportable”).
84 See Matter of L-, 5 I&N Dec. 169, 171-72 (BIA 1953) (stating that the evidence showed that the quantity of drugs found on
the possessor consisted of only two butts of marijuana cigarettes, indicating that such possession, “without more,” did not
constitute the trafficking of narcotics).
85 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E).
89 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h).
90 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)(i).
91 22 U.S.C. § 7108 (2000).
92 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)(iii).
93 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I)(i).
94 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(I)(ii).
95 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
96 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3).
97 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). “S” visas are granted to aliens
who have substantially contributed to the success of an authorized criminal investigation or the prosecution of an individual.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(j).
98 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
99 See Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506, 509 (BIA 1992)
(finding that respondent’s continuous use of illegally obtained
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credit cards did not flow from and was not the natural consequence of s single criminal act).
100 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
101 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900,
903 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gonzales-Vela, 276 F.3d
763, 764 (6th Cir. 2001); Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 256 F.3d 546,
546 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d
1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 317
(2001); Matter of Small, 23 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2002).
103 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
104 See Matter of V-F-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 859, 861 (BIA 2006)
(finding that because states categorize sex crimes against children in many different ways the federal definition needed to be
one of a broad spectrum).
105 Id. at 862.
106 Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I&N. Dec. 991, 996
(BIA 1999).
107 Id. at 995.
108 Id.
109 The term “statutory rape” generally refers to “unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent, as
defined by statute, regardless of whether it is against that persons will.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
110 Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2006).
111 Id.
112 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2000).
113 See, e.g., Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171, 177-78 (BIA
1990) (concluding that the definition of “drug trafficking
crime” for purposes of determining drug-related “aggravated
felonies” within the meaning of the Immigration and
Nationality Act encompasses state convictions for crimes analogous to offenses under the Controlled Substances Act, the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, or the Martime
Drug Law Enforcement Act).
114 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).
115 See Lopez v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct 625, 627-28 (2006) (finding that because the petitioner’s state offense was not punishable as a federal felony it did not count for removal purposes).
116 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000).
117 Id.
118 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) (2000).
119 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).
120 Id.
121 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4).
122 Id.
123 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).
124 See, e.g., Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 556-57 (3d Cir.
2002) (affirming lower court’s denial of petitioner’s writ of
habeas corpus brought after the Board of Immigration Appeal
ordered the removal of petitioner following his conviction for
conspiracy to launder money).
125 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E) (2000).
126 See Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 22 I&N Dec. 1415 (BIA
2000) (affirming immigration judge’s decision that the respondent was eligible to apply for cancellation of removal because
his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon in violation
of California state law is not an aggravated felony under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E), because it is not an offense “described
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in” 18 U.S.C. § 922).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
128 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B). See also Matter of Aldabesheh,
22 I&N Dec. 983, 988 (BIA 1999) (holding that because the
respondent was sentenced to an aggregate term of only three
years and therefore not presumed to have committed a particularly serious crime, the respondent was entitled to an individual
examination of his conviction, the sentence imposed, and the
circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction).
129 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
130 See Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding
that petitioner’s conviction for manslaughter was not a crime of
violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and therefore
not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).
131 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 2 (2004) (finding that a
DUI conviction was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§16(b)).
132 Id.
133 See Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir.
2005) (holding that a state conviction for aggravated involuntary manslaughter was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)).
134 See Garcia v. Gonzalez, 455 F.3d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the Board erroneously concluded that Garcia was
eligible for deportation based on a conviction for reckless
assault, after he struck a pedestrian in his vehicle while speeding); Bejarano-Urrutia, 413 F.3d at 447 (finding that the Board
erred in holding petitioner’s conviction of aggravated involuntary manslaughter a crime of violence within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. §16(b)).
135 See, e.g., Mbea v. Gonzalez, 482 F.3d 276, 277 (4th Cir.
2007).
136 See, e.g., id. (holding that the petitioner’s arson conviction
to be an aggravated felony that rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal); Matter of Palacios, 22 I&N
Dec. 434 (BIA 1998) (stating that petitioner’s state conviction
of arson in the first degree was a conviction of a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(F) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and therefore is deportable, as
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Valdez-Maltos, 443 F.3d 910, 911
(5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 265 (2006) (burglary);
Matter of Brieva-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 766 (BIA 2005) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle).
138 See, e.g., Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2000) (sexual battery); Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 287 (BIA 1996) (statutory rape).
139 See id.
140 See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 378 (10th
Cir. 1993) (concluding that even though the state law definition
of attempted sexual abuse of a child did not specifically involve
physical force as an element, the district court properly concluded that attempted sexual abuse of a child was a crime of
violence).
141 See Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404, 408-09 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding that conviction for sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old
child was a crime of violence under the Act); United States v.
Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
appellant’s prior conviction for sexual assault of a child consti127
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tuted an aggravated felony); Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 583
(11th Cir. 1995) (holding that an attempt to commit a lewd
assault under Florida state law was a crime of violence as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, thus constituting an aggravated
felony).
142 Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006)
(asserting that it is the victim’s actual non-consent that counts).
143 Id. at 1052-53.
144 See Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (vacating and remanding a deportation order after concluding that the
immigration judge was unjustified in limiting his inquiry to the
language of the statute and should have considered the facts
which consisted of consensual sex between a boyfriend and his
fifteen-year-old girlfriend).
145 Id. at 606-07.
146 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
147 See Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 1338, 1345 (BIA 2000)
(holding that the respondent’s conviction for unlawful driving
and taking of a vehicle is a “theft” offense).
148 Id. at 1346.
149 See Matter of Bahta, 22 I&N Dec. 1381, 1383 (BIA 2000)
(concluding that removal proceedings should be terminated
because the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to prove a conviction for either theft or receipt of stolen
property).
150 See Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325, 1326-27 (BIA 2000)
(holding that the respondent’s conviction for burglary of a vehicle is not an aggravated felony burglary offense under the Act).
151 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (asserting
that states cannot have different definitions of burglary since
that would allow sentencing for identical conduct in different
states to turn upon whether the particular states consider the
conduct “burglary”).
152 Matter of Perez, 22 I&N at 1327.
153 8 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2000).
154 Id.
155 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See Matter of Boris, 24 I&N Dec. 111, 117 (BIA 2007)
(holding that respondent’s offense was committed for a “commercial advantage” where it was evident that he knew his
employment was designed to create a profit for the prostitution
business for which he worked).
161 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
162 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2000); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2153 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2382
(2000).
163 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
164 Id.
165 See Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 896 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the charging document which alleged that the
alien submitted false claims to the government in excess of
$10,000 and the conviction were insufficient to show that the
jury had found that the alien’s fraud had resulted in loss of more
than $10,000 and provided a basis for removal).
166 See Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I&N Dec. 306, 306 (BIA
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2007) (finding that the loss may be proved by evidence outside
the record of conviction as long as the loss related to the conduct for which the person was convicted).
167 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
168 Id.
169 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A) and (2).
170 See Matter of Alvarado, 22 I&N Dec. 718, 719 (BIA 1999)
(holding that respondent did not commit an aggravated felony
as he had never been deported for an offense described in another subparagraph).
171 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a) or 1326.
172 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
178 Id.
179 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
180 Id.
181 See Matter of Martinez-Recinos, 23 I&N Dec. 175, 177-78
(BIA 2001) (finding that because all of the parts of the
California Penal Code encompass the definition of the aggravated felony crime of perjury in the federal statute the offense
is an aggravated felony).
182 See Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889, 889 (BIA 1999)
(finding that the obstruction of justice offenses listed “have as
an element interference with the proceedings of a tribunal or
require an intent to harm or retaliate against others who cooperate in the process of justice or might otherwise so cooperate”).
183 Id. at 891.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 892.
186 Id. at 893.
187 See Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955, 955
(BIA 1997) (finding that the offense of accessory of the fact is
an aggravated felony because it falls within the definition of an
obstruction of justice crime and because the respondent’s sentence was at least one year).
188 Id. at 956.
189 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
190 Id.
191 Matter of S-I-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 2007).
192 18 U.S.C. § 758 (2000).
193 Id.
194 See United States v. Clemente E., 392 F.3d 1164, 1164 (10th
Cir. 2004) (concluding that a stop sign does not create a speed
limit and that the failure to stop is not within the plain language
of the statute).
195 18 U.S.C. § 2250.
196 See 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2000) (explaining that individuals
convicted of sexual offenses committed against children are
required to register in the jurisdiction of their residence).
197 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2000).
198 See Matter of Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I&N Dec. 613, 613
(BIA 1988) (holding that the respondent is deportable because
he was convicted twice for the crime of use and being under the
influence of phencyclidine).
199 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
200 Id.
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201 See Matter of Moncada-Servellon, 24 I&N Dec. 62 (BIA
2007) (concluding that the respondent’s conviction for marijuana possession while incarcerated is a valid factual predicate for
the charge of deportability and does not fall within the scope of
the personal-use exception).
202 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(2)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (200).
203 Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330, 336 (BIA 1996) (finding that the record of conviction failed to identify which
weapon the defendant was convicted of possessing).
204 See Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1996) (noting that where the statute under which an alien was convicted
encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and
offenses that do not, the Board looks to the record of conviction
and to other documents admissible as evidence in proving a
criminal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense
of which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of the Act).
205 Id.
206 Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330.
207 Matter of P-F-, 20 I&N Dec. 661 (BIA 1993).
208 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
209 Id.
210 8 USC § 1227 (a)(2)(E).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2000).
214 Id.
215 Id.
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†101(a) (43) (A) – (U)
The term “aggravated felony” means(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;
(B) illicit trafficking in controlled substance (as described in section
102 of the Controlled Substances Act), including a drug trafficking
crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18, United States Code);
(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in
section 921 of Title 18, United States Code) or in explosive materials
(as defined in section 841(c) of that title);
(D) an offense described in section 1956 of Title 18, United States
Code (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957
of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property
derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds
exceeded $10,000;
(E) an offense described in(i) section 842 (h) or (i) of Title 18, United States Code, or section 844
(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials
offenses);
(ii) section 922(g) (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924
(b) or (h) of Title 18, United States Code (relating to firearms offenses); or
(iii) section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to
firearms offenses);
(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, United
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States Code, but not including a purely political offense) for which the
term of imprisonment at least 1 year;
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary
offense for which the term of imprisonment at least 1 year;
(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of Title 18,
United States Code (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom);
(I) an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of Title 18,
United States Code (relating to child pornography);
(J) an offense described in section 1962 of Title 18, United States Code
(relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations, or an offense
described in section 1084 (if it is the second or subsequent offense) or
1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence
of 1 year imprisonment or more may be imposed;
(K) an offense that(i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a
prostitution business; or
(ii) is described in sections 2421, 2422, 2423, of Title 18, United States
Code (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or
(iii) is described in any of sections 1581-1585 or 1588-1591 of Title
18, United States Code (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary
servitude, and trafficking in persons);
(L) an offense described in(i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense
information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information),
2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of
Title 18, United States Code;
(ii) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421)
(relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents);
or
(iii) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents);
(M) an offense that(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000; or
(ii) is described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government
exceeds $10,000;
(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a)
(relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for
which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the
offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s
spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision
of this Act;
(O) an offense described in sections 275(a) or 276 committed by an
alien who was previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an
offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph;
(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of Title 18, United States Code, or is described in section
1546(a) of such title (relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the
term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first
offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only
the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate
a provision of this Act;
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more; and
(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery,
or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have
been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation
of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment
is at least one year;
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to
a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which
a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed; and
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this
paragraph.
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